Description of the transferable belief model to quantify degrees of belief, based on belief functions. The impact of open-and closed-world assumption on conditioning.
INTRODUCTION.
Ignorance can take 2 forms: imprecision and uncertainty. A statement is imprecise if it contains predicates that do not specify uniquely the value of a variable within its referential (e.g. 'John is less than 30 years old', 'John is young'). A statement is uncertain if one cannot evaluate its truth or its falsity given the available data (Dubois et al. [7] ) Imprecision is represented by intervals, fuzzy sets (Dubois and Prade [8] , Mamdani and Gaines [20] ) or possibility functions (Zadeh [46] , Dubois and Prade [9] , Magrez [19] ).
The most classical models to quantify uncertainty are based on probability functions and the Bayesian approach is often considered as the most appropriate (Fine [10] ). lower probability model. Most work in Artificial Intelligence is based on the upper and lower probability interpretation.
The upper and lower probability model is based on works by Good [12] , Smith [42] and Dempster [5, 6] . This model is based on the idea that there is a well-defined probability assigned to each proposition, but that these numerical values are only known by us to be within intervals whose boundaries are the so called upper and lower probabilities. This model generalizes the probability model.
Using this mathematical tool, Shafer [25] suggested that degrees of belief are quantified by belief functions and that belief functions induced by distinct pieces of evidence are combined through Dempster's rule of combination. The fact that this model is completely unrelated to the probability model was not clear, and this distinction was hardly enhanced by recent works. So we feel the necessity to present explicitly the transferable belief model, a normative model we hope might have some cognitive and pragmatic interest.
We insist on the fact that: 1) the transferable belief model is built without ever introducing explicitly or implicitly any concept of probability.
2) Dempster's rule of conditioning is one of the natural ingredients of the transferable belief model. It is not ad hoc [28] . It is at the centre of the model.
3) Dempster's rule of combination will be derived from the transferable belief model, the strongest postulate being the autofunctionality axiom A6, and not the conditioning axiom A4, as A4 is just a formalization of one of the constituents of the transferable belief model.
For the clarity of this paper, it is capital that the points above be borne in mind. The reader should also temporarily forget his/her previous indoctrination in probability theory and the fact that Dempster's rule of conditioning is often presented as a special case of Dempster's rule of combination (which it fortunately is, but which may not be accepted a priori, otherwise the whole derivation of Dempster's rule of combination would be a cyclical reasoning).
Parallelism will often be established with the probability model as it is of course the best known and major contender of the transferable belief model. Part 2 discusses the nature of the frame of discernment on which a degree of belief will be established, and presents the distinction between the open and closed-world assumptions that are too often neglected. This distinction is essential in order to understand the Comb .Ev.
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Part 3 presents the transferable belief model. Shafer [25] introduces his model by postulating that degrees of belief are quantified by Choquet's capacities [4] , but the numerous inequalities that underlie these capacities are hardly satisfactory to convince people of the appropriateness of the model. Hence, the need to redevelop the model.
Part 4 presents Dempster's rule of conditioning.
Part 5 presents an axiomatic justification of Dempster's rule of combination. This ruleknown in the 18th century [26] -may seem natural. Nevertheless an axiomatic derivation is useful in order to show its meaning and its relevance.
Part 6 discusses the impact of the closed-world assumption and hopefully resolves a criticism put forward by Zadeh [47] about the appropriateness of the renormalization encountered in Dempster's rules as defended by Shafer [29] .
Part 7 concludes and summarizes the results.
Computational feasibility of belief functions is an open question. It is usually claimed that
belief functions are computationaly intractable as works is done on power sets. Though theoretically true, the claim is not correct in practice. We even feel that belief functions might require less computational efforts than the use of probability functions. This paper being a theoretical presentation of belief functions, the problem is not investigate further.
THE FRAME OF DISCERNMENT.
Models on reasoning postulate a finite Boolean algebra of propositions Ω on which beliefs will be constructed, some propositions of Ω being believed more than other.
(Ω is also called the frame of discernment, the universe of discourse, the domain of reference.)
Usually only those propositions are considered, any proposition not included in Ω is claimed as impossible.
In reality, the cognitive process is hardly as simple. One first constructs a set KP of those
propositions Known as Possible. But one must also consider 1) the set UP of Unknown Propositions that are not considered and 2) the set KI of those
propositions Known as Impossible. In the classical approach like the bayesian, UP is postulated empty, one accepts a highly idealized closed-world assumption, i.e. that the Comb.Ev.
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The content of the three sets depends not only on the problem under scrutiny, but also on the available pieces of evidence. As evidence becomes available, propositions are redistributed among the three sets:
1) a proposition A is transferred from KP to KI if the evidence is sufficient to claim that A is impossible. It corresponds to conditioning.
2) a proposition A is transferred from UP to KP if the evidence induces us to consider as possible some forgotten propositions.
3) a proposition A is transferred from UP to KI if the evidence induces us to consider that some forgotten propositions are in fact impossible. This has no practical effect as the degrees of belief are constructed only on KP.
4) transfer from KI to KP or UP and from KP to UP would be inconsistent with the definition of the three sets, if one accepts, as here, that the allocation of any proposition to one of the three sets is always correct. A true proposition may be correctly allocated to KP and UP, and a false proposition may be correctly allocated to KP, KI or UP.
A true proposition may not be allocated to KI, and any proposition allocated to KI will stay in KI, inducing monotony for the impossible (false) propositions.
The closed-world assumption corresponds to an a priori empty UP set. The openworld assumption admits the existence of a non-empty UP set, and the fact that the truth might be in UP.
As mentioned before, it is admitted here that the truth may never be in KI. Generalization could be considered by accepting that a true proposition might be in KI and constructing some meta-belief function on the set of all propositions, that expresses the degree of belief that each proposition can belong to any of the three sets. It is not studied in this paper but can be resolved by methods developed in [33] in the framework of the generalized bayesian theorem.
QUANTIFICATION OF THE DEGREE OF BELIEF.
Let KP be a finite Boolean algebra of propositions Ω and let ∆ be the set of elementary propositions of Ω. Let 1 Ω be the tautology relative to Ω i.e. 1 Ω is the disjunction of all elementary propositions of ∆ . Let 0 Ω be the contradiction relative to Ω i.e. none of the propositions of ∆ implies 0 Ω . The conjunction of any two distinct propositions of ∆ is 0 Ω . Any proposition of Ω different from 0 Ω is called a non vacuous proposition.
Notations.
One writes ¬, ∨ ,& for the negation, the disjunction and the conjunction connectives.
Negation of any proposition A in Ω is taken relative to ∆. So ¬A is the disjunction of the elementary propositions of ∆ not implying A. The set UP is denoted Θ. No details about its structure and about KI are needed.
The symbols ∈, →, → / are used with the following meanings:
A∈∆ : A is an element of ∆ A∈Ω : A is a proposition of Ω A→B : "it is true that A implies B" where A, B∈Ω A→ / B : "it is true that A does not imply B" where A, B∈Ω
We write ∑ A→B m(A) and ∑ A→ / B m(A) to mean that the sums must be taken respectively on all A∈Ω that imply B and on all A∈Ω that do not imply B. Note that 0 Ω implies both A and ¬A for all A∈Ω.
The transferable belief model.
Suppose an evidence that induces some belief in us concerning the truth of the propositions A of Ω. It is postulated that there exists some finite amount of belief that can be spread among the various propositions A of Ω, and that given the available pieces of evidence, one allocates parts of that total amount of belief to each proposition.
For instance suppose Mr. White has been murdered and we have three suspects: Henry, Tom and Sarah. Thus ∆ = {Henry, Tom, Sarah}. Given the available pieces of evidence, parts of the amount of belief are allocated to each of the three potential murderers. But some evidence might also point to more than just one of the three persons. Such is the case of the evidence "the murderer is a male". This evidence points to A = "Henry ∨ Tom" and we must allocate some part m of our total mass of belief to A without being able to split it between the two components of A. In such a situation, probabilists usually In the Mr. White's case, m(0 Ω ) corresponds to that amount of belief allocated to none of the three suspects. We must always keep in mind that the murderer might be someone else, e.g. evidence pointing to Sarah and not to Henry and Tom, point in fact to "Sarah or someone not in ∆". In particular m(0 Ω ) is the amount of belief allocated to the proposition that none of the three suspects is the murderer. Had we received the evidence that the murderer must be one of the three suspects i.e. that the closed-world assumption is true, then this new evidence would have induced some conditioning that would have implied m(0 Ω )=0 (see part 6). The fact that m(0 Ω ) might be non null implies that evidence impact is by nature essentially negative in that it allows some propositions to be discarded. Indeed evidence pointing to Sarah essentially does not support 'Henry or Tom'. The method of reasoning simulated by this approach is closer to an elimination process than to a constructive process. A support to a proposition is a non support to its negation taken relative to a closed world.
Shafer's approach postulates beforehand the closed-world assumption. If one defines Ω to include Θ, this would lead to the same results as with the open-world assumption if one is careful never to allocate some masses to propositions of Ω that do not include Θ.
We feel it easier to use the restricted Ω and to allow positive masses to 0 Ω , bearing in mind that all masses given to propositions A∈Ω, are always allocated to A∨Θ, except if the closed-world assumption is explicitly expressed. For simplicity's sake, we drop the Θ, and use the notation A to denote A∨Θ. This implies that A&¬A=0 Ω means Comb 
Given this definition, it can be shown that any belief function is a capacity of order infinite [4] , i.e. satisfies the following inequalities:
2) for every n>0 and every collection A 1 ,A 2 ...A n ∈Ω,
Shafer starts his presentation by requiring that degrees of belief satisfy inequalities (3.1) arguing that the belief in the disjunction of two propositions should at least contain the sum of the belief allocated to each reduced by the belief allocated to their conjunction, equality being unjustified. Unfortunately, this requirement is not sufficient to define belief functions and one must postulate inequalities (3.1) for all n. Critics of Shafer's approach [28] argue against having to postulate all these inequalities, an excessive and not very natural requirement. These criticisms justify why our presentation starts with basic belief masses, not with belief functions.
Given a belief function bel or a basic belief assignment m, the plausibility of a proposition A is the sum of the parts of belief that are allocated to propositions B that do not imply ¬A:
It is related to bel trough
The meaning of 'belief' and 'plausibility' is still controversial. One might prefer to call bel(A) the degree of minimal (or necessary) entailment (or support) for A, and pl(A) the degree of maximal (or potential) entailment (or support) for A. We will hereafter use the words belief and plausibility as they are those most often used in the present context. 
CONDITIONING.
Suppose a basic belief assignment m on Ω obtained after considering some initial evidence. Then, suppose we learn from a new evidence that the truth is necessarily in B∈Ω, thus that all non vacuous propositions implying ¬B should be transferred into KI, the set of propositions known as impossible. How does this evidence modify our basic belief assignment.
Let m' be the basic belief assignment obtained after taking the new evidence into account.
To construct m'(A), three situations must be considered depending on the relation between A∈Ω and the conditioning proposition B. 
Returning to Mr. White's case, suppose the evidence "Henry is not the murderer", then B= {Tom, Sarah}. The portion of belief that was allocated to Tom and/or Sarah remains theirs. The portion that was given to 'Henry or Tom' now supports Tom alone, and the portion that was given to Henry is transferred to 0 Ω . This description of the nature of the transferable belief masses justifies the resulting rule of conditioning. It is part of the whole model and not ad hoc as is often felt.
There are two ways of presenting the use of belief functions. Shafer [25] starts with the concept of a degree of belief represented by a belief function, postulates the inequalities Dempster's rules are ad hoc. Our approach tries to eradicate that erroneous opinion.
COMBINATION OF TWO BELIEF FUNCTIONS.
Suppose Even though Dempster's rule of combination is natural, some justification is required. A set of axioms is given that indeed leads to Dempster's rule of combination. The importance of these axioms rests in the fact that if Dempster's rule of combination is refuted, some of the axioms must explicitly be rejected. A discussion on the adequacy of the axioms is easier than a discussion based directly on the rule itself. The axiom of compositionality A1 claims that the combination is a functional of both belief functions and may be A, but nothing else. This is essentially what was meant by distinct evidences. A concept of distinctness is defined in Smets [37] . Two pieces of evidence are distinct if the knowledge of one of them does not induce a non vacuous belief in the truth of the other. Once Dempster's rule of combination is accepted, distinctness implies compositionality. This concept of distinctness could have been postulated in place of the compositionality, but at the cost of higher complexity.
The axiom of symmetry A2 and the axiom of associativity A3 tell us that the result of the combination of pieces of evidence is independent of the order in which they are considered and/or they are associated.
The axiom of conditioning A4 has been justified in part 4. It implies that if bel 2 is vacuous, bel 12 =bel 1 .
In order to prove the unicity of Dempster's rule of combination, it is much easier to work with commonalty functions as Dempster's rule of combination is q 12 (A)=q 1 (A)q 2 (A).
Many theorems are conveniently described with such commonalty functions. As belief functions are uniquely related to commonalty functions, both approaches are equivalent.
Proofs are given in appendix 3. Two further technical axioms are necessary to prove the final theorem 3.
A7: three-element:
There are at least three elementary propositions in ∆. The proof is based on the properties of triangular norms and absolute monotone functions presented in appendix 1 and 2.
NORMALIZATION.
When Shafer introduced his model, he postulated m(0 Ω )=0 and bel(1 Ω )=1. So after combining two belief functions, he had to normalize the results in order to get How can these two quite contradictory pieces of evidence be combined? Shafer's normalized solution leads to the conclusion that Tom is certainly the murderer.
Zadeh does not accept this solution as it gives full certainty to a solution (Tom) that is hardly supported at all. In fact, in the totally different situation in which both witnesses might have been sure that Tom was the murderer, the result of the combination would have been the same. The unnormalized solution presented within our theory seems much more realistic as it shows Tom to be slightly supported but 0 Ω to be highly supported.
Bearing in mind the semantic of 0 Ω given in part 2, the most obvious conclusion in the present situation is that the real murderer must be a fourth person, i.e. the solution is in the set UP and not in the set KP= ∆ ={Henry, Tom, Sarah}.
There is of course another way of dealing with the present incoherence. The pieces of evidence are combined by a judge who obtains them from two witnesses, each of whom expresses his own belief. The judge must consider his own belief about the reliability of the witnesses. So one could introduce a meta-belief function representing the degree of belief held by the judge about assertions of each witness. Discounting [25, 33] is one way of taking into account this meta-belief. In the present paper we shall restrict ourselves to the case where the two witnesses are wholly reliable.
What further is it that represents the normalization in the present theory? Suppose we are presented with the evidence: 'The murder is necessarily Henry, Tom or Sarah'. How can Comb .Ev.
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In this paper, the combination operator ⊕ has been considered with the open-world assumption and it is shown that Shafer's normalization can be assimilated to the impact of the closed-world conditioning. It takes in account Zadeh's criticisms because if the closed-world assumption is true, than the only murderer is Tom as Henry and Sarah have been eliminated by witnesses 1 and 2 respectively.
The real counter intuitive result observed within Zadeh's counter example results not so much from the normalization than from the acceptation of the closed-world assumption.
In real world situation, it is obvious that if one can really believe both witnesses, then one should seriously question the closed-world assumption. Solution m 12 has the advantage of showing the practical impact of the closed-world conditioning that was not visible with Shafer's solution.
CONCLUSIONS.
The present paper has presented the transferable belief model used to quantify This model must not be confused with the upper and lower probabilities model or some interval valued probabilities model, that corresponds usually to the interpretation given by those who use Dempster-Shafer's theory [16] . In these models, one postulates the existence of some probabilities that quantify our degrees of belief, but the exact value of each probability is only known to be between two boundaries. In the transferable belief model, no probability whatsoever is introduced. Probabilities are irrelevant.
The transferable belief model is also different conceptually and mathematically from the bayesian model. Conceptually the bayesian assumption that belief is quantified by probabilities rests on betting and decision arguments. The transferable belief model applies at the cognitive level, a level where the concepts of bets and decisions are not required. It is true that once a decision is involved, one must construct a probability function based on the belief function that describes the cognitive state. But nowhere in the bayesian approach is there an argument that requires that, at the cognitive level, beliefs be Comb.Ev.
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Mathematically, a probability function is a particular case of a belief function where positive masses are allocated only to elementary propositions of Ω. Dempster's rule of conditioning reduces itself into classical probabilistic conditioning. But Dempster's rule of combination does not have its real counterpart in probability theory. Dempster's rule of combination with closed-world assumption can be seen as identical to the combination of two a posteriori probability functions defined on Ω if the a priori probability function on Ω gives the same probability to every elementary proposition of Ω and if the two pieces of evidence are conditionally independent given each elementary proposition of Ω. Generalization to the case where the a priori probabilities are not constant is immediate if one is careful not to introduce it twice in the ⊕ combination [33] . These mathematical similitudes should not be interpreted as implying that the transferable belief model is a generalization of the bayesian model. We rather see them as two complementary models, the transferable belief model normatively describes cognitive state, the bayesian model normatively describes decision bevahiors.
Any measure of cognitive process gets its meaning only if one can provide an objective tool through which this measure can be assessed. Exchangeable bets is the one used by bayesians. The translator example is the one used for belief functions [30, 40] .
One particularity of the transferable belief model is that it allows a positive mass allocated to the contradiction. The meaning of such allocation can be understood if one gives due consideration to the difference between the open and the closed-world assumption. The frame of discernment Ω is an a priori construct on which belief is distributed. But one should not ignore that this frame is usually nothing but an intellectual construct and that it may be that none of the propositions of Ω is true. The impact of the closed-world assumption is studied and a normalization coefficient is derived, the result is Shafer's model. The advantage of distinguishing between the open and the closed-world is that it allows evaluation of the degree of conflict among the pieces of evidence as far as Ω is concerned, therefore to judge the appropriateness of the frame of discernment Ω and of the closed-world assumption.
The second part of the paper provides axioms that imply the Dempster's rule of combination used to combine two belief functions derived from two distinct pieces of evidence. Distinctness is defined in relation to the compositionality axiom A1. The major axiom is the conditioning axiom A4 that results directly from the structure of the transferable belief model, i.e. a mass initially allocated to some proposition A that could Comb .Ev.
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It would have been interesting to construct counter examples for which the autofunctionality axiom A6 would not be fulfilled. This is easy if one restricts the belief functions to the so called consonant belief functions by Shafer [25] and necessity functions in Dubois and Prade [9] . These are belief functions for which the masses are allocated on propositions A 1 ,A 2 ...A n such that A i →A i+1 : i=1...n-1.. In that case, bel(A&B) = min{bel(A) , bel(B)} pl(A∨B) = max{pl(A) , pl(B)}.
Acceptable solutions are q 12 (A)=min { T(q 1 (t),q 2 (t)) : t∈A } where T is any T-norm. They obey A6 iff T=T 0 (the min-based T norm). But consonant belief functions are only particular cases of belief functions and are too restrictive to describe someone's degree of belief.
In conclusion, the transferable belief model presents two characteristics: the masses allocation that leads to superadditive belief functions to describe someone's degree of belief and a rule to combine two distinct evidences. The interest of the first aspect is usually recognized. But the combination rule was felt to be ad hoc by critics [28] , especially when they interpret the transferable belief model as an upper and lower probabilities model. This paper provides axioms that explain the meaning of Dempster's rule of combination within the transferable belief model.
Belief functions provide a model that should be most useful in developing Expert
Systems that need to handle uncertainty. Its theoretical use for medical diagnosis was considered in Smets [33, 34, 35] , the generalization of Bayes's theorem necessary for inferences is developed in Smets [33, 38, 39] and the concept of degree of belief in a fuzzy proposition in Smets [36] .
APPENDIX 1. Triangular norms.
The concept of triangular norms (T-norms) are fully developed in Scheizer and Sklar [22, 23, 24] , see also Weber [44] . A particular T-norm is the product function T 1 with T 1 (a,b) = a⋅b.
Definition. A T-norm is

APPENDIX 2. Monotone functions.
Let a function f(x) defined on a segment 0R. Let the successive differences ∆ i f be positive on the segment 0R for i=1, 2...n and any positive h Given the proofs are much easier when arrived at with commonalty functions, we translate axioms A1 to A4 into axioms Q1 to Q4, their counterpart based on commonality functions. We write q ij for q i ⊕q j . ∀A→ / C means ∀A such that A&¬C≠0 Ω . The comparison of the two f functions shows that q 12 (A) does not depend on q 2 (X) ∀X→ / C. This is true for all C such that A→C and among others for C = A. Thus q 12 (A)
Q1: compositionality axioms:
does not depend on q 2 (X) ∀X→ / A. It depends only on q 2 (X) for X→A.
By symmetry (axiom Q2) one concludes that q 12 (A) depends only on the q 1 (X) and q 2 (X) for X→A.
QED.
Lemma 1: Let q B be the commonality function corresponding to a conditioning on B. QED.
Lemma 7:
Under lemma 6 conditions, T is non decreasing in its arguments.
P r o o f :
By definition, q(A)≥q(A∨ B) for all A,B∈ Ω. Thus one has T(q 1 (A),q 2 (A))≥T(q 1 (A∨B),q 2 (A∨B)). It is equivalent to T(x+ε, y+δ)≥T(x,y) for all ε, δ≥0.
QED.
Lemma 8: Under lemma 6 conditions, the T function is a T-norm. 2: T must be associative, which is true by axiom Q3.
Proof
3: T must be non decreasing in its arguments, which is true by lemma 7.
4: T(1,a)=a, which is true by lemma 5.
QED.
Definition: T'(x,y) and T"(x,y) are the first and second derivates of T(x,y) taken for x. As T admits a second derivate, one divides both terms by ε, and takes the limit for ε→0. One obtains T"(x,y+δ)≥T"(x,y).
QED.
Theorem 3:
Given axioms Q1 to Q8, q 12 is such that for all A∈Ω q 12 (A) = q 1 (A) . q 2 (A)
Proof: Given lemma 9, one knows that T'(x,y) and T"(x,y) exist and are non negative.
Therefore one has the representation (see appendix 2): Thus Ø®∏ is true but Ø®˝ and Ø®B are false as Ø is not an elementary proposition.
For any A®∏, ¿@@A@@¿ is the number of elementary propositions B®˝ such that B®A.
All the presentation could have been done using sets, unions, intersections, and inclusions. Our choice reflects a personal preference supported by the feeling that the natural domain of a belief is more the truth of a proposition than the belonging to a set. 
